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GLOBAL ANALYTICAL LESSONS FOR EVALUATING A
MYANMAR SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND
Oliver T. Gilbert †
Abstract: After decades of international condemnation, Myanmar, also known as
Burma, has initiated rapid political, economic, and legal reforms. In recognition of these
reforms, Western governments have broadly curtailed longstanding sanctions against
investing in Myanmar. This sudden opportunity for foreign companies to extract
Myanmar’s plentiful petroleum resources has increased the need for Myanmar to
implement resource revenue management strategies to guard against adverse
consequences of the resource curse. Among these strategies is a call by respected global
commentators to create a Myanmar sovereign wealth fund (“SWF”).
This article describes each of the main effects generally associated with the resource
curse and analyzes how existing global SWFs have been designed to help countries
prevent these problems. This article then explores Myanmar’s current political and
economic environment to speculate how establishing a SWF would address resource
curse concerns and impact Myanmar. In doing so, this article argues that Myanmar
currently lacks necessary legal, political, economic, and managerial capacities to support
a national sovereign wealth fund at the present time.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Once described as an “outpost of tyranny” by former U.S. Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice,1 Myanmar has recently initiated a series of rapid
political and economic reforms that have generated significant global
attention.2 Western governments have recognized the pace of Myanmar’s
sweeping reforms and have rewarded Myanmar by curtailing many
longstanding economic sanctions on the country. 3 As a result, foreign
individuals and corporations are eyeing Myanmar as a “final frontier” for
foreign direct investment.4
Increased opportunities to invest in Myanmar will be particularly
significant to the country’s oil and gas sector, where a high demand already
†

M.A. (Johns Hopkins University), B.A. (George Washington University). Many thanks to my
fantastic and supportive family and friends who endured never-ending discussions about Myanmar and
sovereign wealth funds. Special thanks to Dustin Drenguis and the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal
editorial staff. Any errors are my own. None of the views expressed here purport to reflect the views of
my current or previous employers.
1
Rice Names “Outposts of Tyranny,” BBC NEWS (Jan.19, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/4186241.stm.
2
See Timeline: Reforms in Burma, BBC NEWS (April 22, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-asia-16546688.
3
See id.
4
Patrick Barta, Final Frontier: Firms Flock to Newly Opened Myanmar, WALL STREET JOURNAL
(Nov. 12, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390443749204578050773460553586.
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exists for the country’s proven petroleum reserves, consisting of
approximately 10 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 50 million barrels of
crude oil. 5 Resource revenue information released for the first time in July
2012 state that the country collected USD 16 billion during 2006-2012 from
Myanmar’s existing Yadana and Yetagun natural gas pipelines.6 In addition,
the Shwe pipeline to China, which became operational in July 2013, will
provide USD 54 billion to Myanmar over the next thirty years.7 Lastly,
Myanmar’s Zawtika offshore natural gas pipeline, expected to produce
natural gas for domestic consumption, is planned to open mid-year, 2014.8
Zawtika project status updates are unavailable at the time of publication.
Furthermore, in 2013, Myanmar invited previously prohibited Western
companies to explore additional onshore and offshore blocks.9 However,
anticipated increases in foreign direct investment are not limited to Western
countries. China and India both seek Myanmar’s resources to support their
own energy needs and geopolitical goals in the region.10 In addition, with
the support of the Asian Development Bank (“ADB”), countries in the
Greater Mekong Sub-region have identified Myanmar’s petroleum resources
as a key component of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”)
plans to establish and access trans-ASEAN energy sources.11
The high demand for Myanmar’s petroleum resources and changes to
the country’s regulatory landscape will provide Myanmar much needed
revenue. However, the sudden influx of non-renewable, resource-focused
investment has led global commentators, including former World Bank
5

Cheang Chee Yew, Myanmar Prepares Ground to Boost Upstream Oil, Gas Investments,
RIGZONE (July 1, 2013), http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/127412/Myanmar_Prepares_Ground_
to_Boost_Upstream_Oil_Gas_Investments.
6
Ministry Reveals Gas Revenue for First Time, THE NATION, (July 18, 2012),
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/aec/Ministry-reveals-gas-revenue-for-first-time-30186368.html.
7
China Begins Receiving Natural Gas from Shwe Pipeline, THE IRRAWADY (July 8, 2013),
http://www.investmyanmar.biz/infoNews.php?id=1342; Demand for Suspension of Shwe Gas Project
Raised, BURMA NEWS INTERNATIONAL (Oct. 2, 2013) http://www.bnionline.net/index.php/news/narinjara/
16290-demand-for-suspension-of-shwe-gas-project-raised.html.
8
Kyaw Hsu Mon, Thai-Run Gas Field to Help Meet Burma's Power Needs, THE IRRAWADDY
(March 28, 2014), http://www.irrawaddy.org/business/thai-run-gas-field-help-meet-burmas-powerneeds.html.
9
Jacob Gronholt-Pederson, Myanmar Invites Foreign Energy Firms to Explore 23 Offshore O&G
Blocks, RIGZONE (July 28, 2012), http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/119414/Myanmar_Invites_
Foreign_Energy_Firms_to_Explore_23_Offshore_OG_Blocks.
10
China and India Vie for Myanmar, ASIA BRIEFING (May 29, 2013), http://www.asiabriefing.com
/news/2013/05/china-and-india-vie-for-myanmar/.
11
Greater Mekong Subregion: Energy, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK http://www.adb.org/countries/
gms/sector-activities/energy (last visited May 22, 2014); Building a Sustainable Energy Future: The
Greater Mekong Subregion, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, http://www.adb.org/publications/buildingsustainable-energy-future-greater-mekong-subregion (last visited May 22, 2014).
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Chief Economist and Nobel Prize winner in Economics, Joseph Stiglitz,
researchers from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the
Bloomberg editorial staff to recommend that Myanmar create a national
sovereign wealth fund (“SWF”) to better manage anticipated petroleum
revenues and enable Myanmar to avoid problems generally associated with
the “resource curse.” 12
The resource curse, also known as the “paradox of plenty,” is a
phenomenon in which countries with an abundance of non-renewable
resources frequently experience stagnant or negative economic growth.13 In
addition, it is common for these countries to then become overly dependent
on commodity revenues, which can lead to a volatile state gross domestic
product (“GDP”) and cause related adverse macroeconomic effects. 14
Moreover, political corruption, also a component of resource curse theory,
can spread due to the lack of effective legal and regulatory systems to
manage revenues, resource rights, income distribution frameworks, and
additional government operations.15
Multiple countries have established SWFs to guard against adverse
effects of the resource curse. Drawing from these examples, global
commentators suggest that at-risk countries should deposit resource
revenues into a SWF with “watertight governance and clear investment
rules.”16 However, this policy recommendation is unrealistic if overarching
state structures have not already created an environment for this type of
governance oasis to exist.
This article analyzes global lessons from existing SWFs to evaluate
how creating a resource-funded SWF would impact Myanmar and mitigate
traditional resource curse concerns. This subject is important and timely
given Myanmar’s anticipated influx of extractive project revenue and the
lack of clear strategies to avoid suffering from the resource curse. In
contrast to some global experts’ recommendations,17 this article is cautious
of the short-term feasibility of a Myanmar SWF.
12

Siri Jegarajah, Myanmar Needs Sovereign Wealth Fund to Avoid Resources Curse: Stiglitz, CNBC
(Jun. 2, 2012), http://www.cnbc.com/id/47698494; Myanmar’s Mandela Moment, BLOOMBERG VIEW (May
19, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-19/myanmar-needs-help-to-manage-its-mandelamoment.html.
13
Resource Curse, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/resource-curse.asp (last
visited July 11, 2013).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Vikram Nehru, Myanmar’s Five Economic Priorities, EMERGING FRONTIERS (April 24, 2012),
http://emergingfrontiersblog.com/2012/04/24/myanmars-five-economic-priorities/.
17
See Jegarajah, supra note 12; Myanmar's Mandela Moment, supra note 12.
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The structure of this article is as follows. First, this article briefly
defines sovereign wealth funds and acknowledges the limitations of
generalizing diverse financial instruments under this umbrella. Each
following section then addresses key concerns that are generally associated
with the resource curse and draws examples from brief case studies of
existing global SWFs to describe how SWFs can mitigate these problems.
This article then describes Myanmar’s related capacities or vulnerabilities
before theorizing how a Myanmar SWF might impact those same problem
areas.
Following the analysis, this article identifies multiple important
components for establishing a responsibly managed SWF and evaluates
Myanmar’s balance of payments surplus, fiscal discipline, and prerequisite
domestic legal and financial institutional capacities that are necessary to
responsibly finance and administer a SWF. In addition, this article analyzes
SWFs’ ability to compensate for macroeconomic effects of the resource
curse and discusses economic options for Myanmar. Lastly, this article
explores Myanmar’s rampant corruption and poor transparency policies to
estimate Myanmar’s current ability to apply international governance best
practices to managing a SWF.
This article concludes by summarizing the institutional capacities in
need of improvement prior to the creation of any type of Myanmar SWF.
Furthermore, through the prism of analyzing SWFs, this article’s conclusion
identifies key legal, economic, and political factors that must be reformed to
maximize benefits from extractive resource projects without relying on
complex financial tools.
This article does not seek to label all SWFs as adverse financial
instruments and frequently praises selected SWFs for their effective wealth
management and responsible resource stewardship. Instead, this article
suggests that a Myanmar SWF may underperform or fail due to Myanmar’s
current political and economic realities. Consequently, a Myanmar SWF is
not an appropriate resource revenue management strategy to maximize
benefits at the current stage of Myanmar’s national development, but may be
appropriate once Myanmar improves underlying state capacities outlined in
this article.
II.

WHAT IS A SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND?

The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, an organization dedicated to the
study of these funds and other long-term investments, defines a SWF as, “a
state-owned investment fund or entity that is commonly established from
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balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the
proceeds of privatizations, governmental transfer payments, fiscal surpluses,
and/or receipts resulting from resource exports.”18 This definition can be
further narrowed using a description of SWFs, by Monitor, a global strategic
advisory firm, as investment funds owned by governments that are distinct
from both official reserves and the capital available to state-ownedenterprises (“SOEs”).19 This restricted definition allows for a more targeted
analysis of fund operations by separating special fund operations from other
state-guided financial operations.20
This article addresses the major areas of concern associated with the
resource curse and includes additional impacts when applicable. It is
important to recognize that even under the narrowed definition above, the
term “sovereign wealth fund” is a broad classification that includes a variety
of different investment vehicles, each tasked with their own unique
objectives. For example, commodity-based funds can be used for fiscal
stabilization or preventing inflation, while non-commodity-based funds
might be used to make investments with surplus amounts of a particular
foreign currency.21
Accordingly, it is unreasonable to describe one type of SWF as failing
in regards to other SWF goals it was not designed to accomplish. For
example, a SWF designed to assist commodity price stability cannot be
faulted for not providing individual annual dividends if it was not designed
to do so. As a result, countries may establish multiple independent SWFs in
an effort to concurrently pursue multiple objectives, and this article
recognizes that no single SWF can mitigate the simultaneous problems
associated with the resource curse. Therefore, analysis of SWFs in each of
the following sections is careful to note how specific types of SWFs may
address the specific concerns they were designed to influence.
III.

PREREQUISITE CAPACITIES

Sovereign wealth funds require a range of capacities to meet financial
or strategic objectives. Among the most important are state revenue
18

What Is a Sovereign Wealth Fund?, SWF INSTITUTE, http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereignwealth-fund/ (last visited May 22, 2014).
19
Victoria Barbary & Bernardo Bortolotti, Braving the New World: Sovereign Wealth Fund
Investment in 2010, 38 THE MONITOR (2011).
20
Daniel W. Drezner, White Whale or Red Herring?: Assessing Sovereign Wealth Funds, REP.
GLASSHOUSE FORUM, 2008.
21
Lee Hudson Teslik, Sovereign Wealth Funds, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 29, 2009),
http://www.cfr.org/sovereign-wealth-funds/sovereign-wealth-funds/p15251.
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surpluses, government fiscal discipline, and legal and economic experience
needed to guide fund operations. Unfortunately, Myanmar currently lacks
many of these prerequisite capacities: it does not have a budgetary surplus,
financial discipline has been absent, and it lacks financial and legal
expertise. These problems would put a burgeoning SWF at a disadvantage.
This section describes these problems in detail by exploring funding
concerns, fiscal discipline needs, and financial and legal capacity concerns.
A.

Funding

SWFs are financed by national revenue in pursuit of a variety of
economic goals. Regardless of fund objectives or the sources of funding,
contributions to SWFs should be the result of budgetary surpluses that
enable states to finance investments with excess capital.22 According to
Martin Skancke, the Director General of the Norwegian Ministry of Finance,
“[i]f a [sovereign wealth] fund is set up with an allocation rule that is not
linked to actual surpluses, the accumulations of assets in the fund will not
reflect actual savings.”23
Put simply, countries without budget surpluses would likely have to
borrow money to invest in a SWF while neglecting other fiscal obligations.
For this precise reason, India recently canceled its plans to establish a SWF
because the country lacks adequate foreign exchange reserves. Indian
officials had originally designated USD 10 billion for a state SWF, but the
Indian Department of Economic Affairs advised the government to establish
a fund only when the country enjoys a current account surplus.24 India is
projected to have a balance of payments deficit, estimated at approximately
5% of GDP, and plans to create a SWF have been tabled for the time being.25
Myanmar’s balance of payments deficit amounted to approximately
3.2% of GDP for 2012-2013. 26 However, Myanmar’s changing fiscal
obligations as a partial result of international loan forgiveness by Japan and
22

Angela Cummine, Overcoming Divided Skepticism: Why the World's Sovereign Wealth Funds Are
Not Paying Dividends, 6 INT. J. OF BASIC INCOME RES. 1, 9 (2011).
23
Id.
24
Finance Ministry Opposes Sovereign Wealth Fund out of Forex Reserves, THE ECONOMIC TIMES
(Apr. 24, 2013), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-04-24/news/38790536_1_cash-richpsus-foreign-currency-reserves-foreign-exchange-reserves.
25
R. Jagannathan, India Abandons a Stupid Idea: No Sovereign Wealth Fund, FIRSTBIZ. (Feb. 25,
2013), http://www.firstbiz.com/economy/india-abandons-a-stupid-idea-no-sovereign-wealth-fund37014.html.
26
Khin Myo Thwe, Burma's Budget Deficit Falls to 3.2 Percent, MIZZIMA NEWS (Jan. 25, 2013),
http://archive-2.mizzima.com/business/8793-burmas-budget-deficit-falls-to-32-percent-.html?tmpl=
component&print=1&layout=default&page=.
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Norway should not be considered robust fiscal strength. 27 Ultimately,
Myanmar’s deficit is a signal that Myanmar should fulfill financial
obligations and reprioritize spending decisions before sterilizing national
resource profits in a SWF. Without a budgetary surplus, investments in a
SWF are only investments with borrowed money. Therefore, Myanmar
should establish a budgetary surplus before investing in a SWF. 28
B.

Fiscal Discipline

SWFs require a high degree of fiscal discipline to balance current
government spending needs alongside realistic investment concerns. States
without a high degree of fiscal discipline may be prone to treat SWF assets
as “rainy day” funds. For example, Ireland took EUR 17.5 billion (USD
23.1 billion) from its National Pensions Reserve Fund as part of the
country’s bailout obligations with the International Monetary Fund
(“IMF”).29
In past decades, Myanmar’s military dictatorship exhibited an
extensive history of misappropriation, corruption, and a lack of
transparency.30 Known as the “Burmese way of Socialism”, from 1962 to
1988, Myanmar’s military junta implemented a series of reforms that
destroyed Myanmar’s economic productivity through mass nationalization,
arbitrary policy driven by military leader, Ne Win’s personal superstitions,
and brutal military oppression.31 Decades of disastrous reform is one of the
largest reasons why Myanmar lags far behind its neighbors’ rapid
development.32 These poor governance practices also contributed to false
reporting of economic data, leaving the international community without
clear information about Myanmar’s true economic landscape.33
27

Myanmar Signs Deal with Foreign Creditors, FT.COM (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms
/s/0/9b2d6e4c-68b2-11e2-9a3f-00144feab49a.html#axzz32VKE6oJY (last visited May 4, 2014).
28
Jagannathan, supra note 25.
29
Rich Barbieri, EU Unveils Irish Bailout, CNNMONEY (Dec. 2, 2010), http://money.cnn.com
/2010/11/28/news/international/ireland_bailout/index.htm.
30
See Myanmar Profile, BBC NEWS (May 16, 2014), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific12990563.
31
Mark Tallentire, The Burma Road to Ruin, THE GUARDIAN (Sep. 28, 2007),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/sep/28/burma.uk; 1962 Coup & Ne Win Regime. OXFORD BURMA
ALLIANCE, http://www.oxfordburmaalliance.org/1962-coup--ne-win-regime.html.
32
Michael Schuman, Will Burma Become Asia’s Next Economic Tiger?, TIME (Aug. 22, 2012),
http://business.time.com/2012/08/22/will-burma-become-asias-next-economic-tiger/.
33
A Legacy of Mismanagement: The State of Burma’s Economy, MIZZIMA NEWS (July 3, 2009),
http://archive-2.mizzima.com/edop/interview/2400-a-legacy-of-mismanagement-the-state-of-burmaseconomy.html (last visited May 4, 2014).
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Recent governance and economic reforms offer potential for rising
generations of leaders to guide Myanmar’s financial operations with greater
fiscal diligence than their predecessors. 34 Nonetheless, fiscal discipline and
fiscal capacity must be developed over time and likely with the guidance of
welcomed international advisors. However, SWFs should not be considered
hands-on training for establishing fiscal discipline, nor can a SWF’s
existence jump-start it. A study conducted by Revenue Watch Institute
found no direct and demonstrable correlation between the existence of a
SWF and improved fiscal performance.35
Literature regarding Mongolia’s planned SWF has also argued that
effective and sustainable fiscal discipline must be established well in
advance of the creation of SWFs for funds to be successful. 36 Similarly,
according to Eric Parrado, a former manager of Chile’s SWFs, without fiscal
discipline “a fund is not a SWF in anything but name.”37
C.

Financial & Legal Capacity

Sovereign wealth funds are managed separately from other central
bank activities because SWFs are complex financial vehicles that require
innovative and flexible methods that are best managed outside the scope of
typical budgetary operations.38 Financial expertise is important to ensure
SWF funds are invested appropriately. One possibility for countries, like
Myanmar, that lack financial expertise is to seek assistance from foreign
financial experts. However, foreign experts may be disconnected from
domestic interests, as highlighted in examples with Nigeria’s proposed SWF,
described below. Moreover, Myanmar also lacks legislative capacity, which
is necessary to outline the SWF’s rules and objectives. 39
Sovereign wealth fund experts Adam D. Dixon and Ashby Monk have
argued that SWFs must be staffed with financial and legal technocrats to
34

Schuman, supra note 32.
ANTOINE HEUTY & JUAN ARISTI, FOOL’S GOLD: ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF ALTERNATIVE
FISCAL INSTRUMENTS DURING THE COMMODITIES BOOM AND THE GLOBAL CRISIS 10 (Revenue Watch
Institute ed., 2013), available at http://archive-2011.revenuewatch.org/files/RWI_Fools_Gold_Heuty_
Aristi_FINAL.pdf.
36
Loch Adamson, Institutional Investor: Mongolia Aims to Join the SWF Ranks, ORIGO (2011),
http://www.origoplc.com/press/institutional-investor-mongolia-aims-to-join-the-swf-ranks/.
37
Id.
38
Adam D. Dixon & Ashby H.B. Monk, The Design and Governance of Sovereign Wealth Funds,
SOC. SCI. RESEARCH NETWORK (Oct. 30, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=1951573.
39
Id.
35
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effectively design and manage a fund.40 However, many resource-dependent
and developing states seeking to establish a SWF lack domestic financial or
legal experts. 41 Without domestic fiscal discipline, financial expertise, and
legislative clarity, public officials may poorly allocate funds to a state SWF
to the detriment of the state. 42 As a result, states sometimes seek foreign
experts to manage funds. 43 However, externally managed SWFs may be
disconnected from domestic interests and can raise public concerns for
increased domestic control over their national resources. 44 In addition,
generally speaking, relying on foreign experts to solve domestic problems
may not provide a sustainable solution to ongoing state planning needs.
Nigeria’s planned oil-funded SWFs exemplify this dilemma. Article
6(1) of the legislation establishing the Nigeria Sovereign Investment
Authority provides that, “The Authority may at any time appoint asset
managers outside the Authority to manage its assets as may be specified by
the board.”45 However, Ayo Salami, a London-based asset manager at Duet
Management, forecasted an anticipated domestic pressure for Nigeria’s SWF
to invest with Nigerian managers even though the country lacks enough
Nigerian financial experts to reasonably accommodate this need. 46
Accordingly, in 2013, Nigeria announced that JP Morgan will manage the
country’s SWF.47 Uche Orji, a former UBS analyst and Nigerian fund
manager who has lived outside of Nigeria for the past seventeen years, will
manage the Nigerian SWF.48 Time will tell if JP Morgan’s mixed foreign
management team can reconcile maximizing returns with accommodating
domestic investment priorities.
Myanmar currently lacks the financial or legislative expertise
necessary to avoid the problems demonstrated in the examples above.
40

Id.
Id.
42
Id.
43
See e.g., Ben Agande, JPMorgan to Manage Sovereign Wealth Funds, VANGUARD NEWS (Feb.
21, 2013), http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/02/jp-morgan-to-manage-soverign-wealth-funds/; Agustino
Fontevecchia, Goldman Sachs Lost 98% of Libya's $1.3B Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment, FORBES
MAGAZINE (May 31, 2011), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2011/05/31/goldmansachs-lost-98-of-libyas-1-3b-sovereign-wealth-fund-investment/.
44
Sarah Rundell, African Countries Come to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Party, TOP1000FUNDS.COM
(Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.top1000funds.com/analysis/2012/12/05/african-countries-come-to-thesovereign-wealth-fund-party/ (last visited May 22, 2014).
45
Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority Act (2011) 64 O.G. 98 (Nigeria), available at
http://nsia.com.ng/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/NSIA_ACT.pdf.
46
Id.
47
Agande, supra note 43.
48
Tolu Ogunlesi, Meet The Man Who’ll Manage Nigeria’s Sovereign Wealth Fund, VENTURES
AFRICA (July 15, 2013), http://www.ventures-africa.com/2013/07/hot-shot-nigerian-export-returns-home/.
41
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Myanmar’s banking system is broken. 49 According to a report by the
Myanmar Union Auditor General’s Office, the Myanmar Economic Bank, a
large state-owned bank, has not generated a profit in twenty-two years and
has been operating at a loss since 1990.50
Decades of isolation have also drastically reduced technocratic
management experience that could be applied to managing a SWF.
According to Mr. Turnell, Myanmar’s economic governance is limited “to a
handful of individuals skilled in policy formulation, and fewer still schooled
in the attributes necessary for institution building.”51 More recently, in
2013, Myanmar’s parliament passed legislation to clear the way for
Myanmar to establish an independent central bank.52 Myanmar should first
demonstrate an ability to responsibly administer routine functions of this
basic independent body before it creates an independent SWF. Likewise,
Myanmar should encourage domestic financial expertise before outsourcing
complex financial operations to foreign experts to prioritize national
interests, even if national interests do not maximize financial best interests.
Legislation outlining a SWF’s rules and investment objectives prior to
the fund’s creation is essential for preventing systemic failures. One historic
example of this type of failure is Papua New Guinea’s former SWF, the
Mineral Resources Stabilization Fund (“MRSF”). 53 The MRSF was
established in 1974 to manage revenue from the country’s Panguana copper
mine and reduce commodity price volatility.54 Original legislation planned
for the fund to collect all revenues from extractive resource projects and then
fund Papua New Guinea’s state budget using a complex formula for
maximum annual withdrawals.55 However, amendments to the MRSF Act
allowed unlimited government withdrawals from the account, and the fund

49

Sean Turnell, Burma’s Economic Transition: Where It’s At, Where It Might Go, ASIALINK, (May
2012) (on file with the author).
50
Myanmar Economic Bank Has Been Losing Money for Two Decades: Audit Report, ELEVEN
NEWS (July 13, 2013). http://elevenmyanmar.com/business/2752-myanmar-economic-bank-has-beenlosing-money-for-two-decades-audit-report.
51
See Turnell, supra note 49.
52
Natasha Brereton-Fukui, Myanmar Is Closer to Autonomous Central Bank, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL (June 9, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873239499045785351
41675555294.html. Note that as of publication of this article, the president has yet to sign the legislation.
53
MARTIN GOULD, MANAGING MANNA FROM BELOW: SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES IN THE PACIFIC, (Australian Treasury Department ed., 2010), available at
http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1783/HTML/docshell.asp?URL=05_SWFs_in_the_Pacific.htm.
54
Id.
55
Id.
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was forced to close in 1999 once government borrowing under original legal
guidelines became unsustainable.56
Myanmar’s legal expertise is similarly limited. According to a report
by the global law firm DLA Piper, Myanmar graduates approximately 200 to
300 lawyers each year.57 However, qualifications to gain admittance to law
school in Myanmar are the lowest among all professions in the country, and
students generally memorize information without learning a practical
application of law.58 In fact, the Myanmar Union Attorney General assumes
that “newly-hired lawyers in his office have no sufficient legal education
prior to entering their six-month training program.” 59 However, even
though Myanmar graduates and trains a marginal number of lawyers each
year, over 1,000 attorneys have been reprimanded, suspended, and disbarred
over the past twenty years. 60 Lastly, Mr. Turnell reports that “the IMF and
[World Bank] have found few, if any, legally qualified (or skilled)
counterparties in the Burmese government” to assist in drafting laws.61
As a result, drafting legislation has historically been a challenge for
Myanmar. In his report, Mr. Turnell describes a common practice in both
the previous and current governments to sub-contract the legislative writing
process to outside parties.62 Alarmingly, Mr. Turnell’s report anecdotally
cites that a South Korean sub-contractor’s flawed translations into domestic
corporate taxation law ultimately made the law unenforceable and
meaningless.63 Steps toward reform will hopefully include an openness to
accept international assistance to guide legal drafting in the future.
Ultimately, Myanmar’s lack of domestic financial or legal capacity
means that a Myanmar SWF likely lacks the technocratic oversight
necessary to establish SWF rules and objectives, manage the operations of a
SWF, and accommodate domestic pressures. While foreign financial experts
could be used to manage fund operations, promoting domestic financial
expertise would offer more sustainable fund guidance and help ensure that
fund operations are being directed in accordance to national best interests
even if actions do not maximize fund profits. Myanmar must take steps to
strengthen these weaknesses prior to the creation of a SWF.
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ADDRESSING THE RESOURCE CURSE

Analyzing individual components of the resource curse can help
determine how effectively sovereign wealth funds can mitigate similar
resource curse concerns. Gauging a SWF’s utility toward this task alongside
Myanmar’s current economic, social, and political realities provides greater
insight into how a SWF would likely impact Myanmar. As a result, this
section first discusses economic factors of the resource curse, such as
economic diversification, inflation, exchange rate stability, and commodity
price stability. Thereafter, this section evaluates the need for
intergenerational justice and savings, as well as the opportunity cost of
investing in a SWF. Lastly, this section examines points of conflict and
political division, including varying levels of domestic political consensus,
public consent, and the equitable division of wealth.
A.

Economic Diversity

The resource curse theory hypothesizes that dependence on
commodity revenue can direct already limited investments further towards
that same industry to increase efficiency and profitability for extracting
proven resources.64 However, without reinvesting profits into other sectors,
countries will subsequently fail to diversify their economies.65 In fact, the
ADB found in its 2012-2014 Interim Country Partnership Strategy that
roughly one-third of Myanmar’s USD 13.6 billion of foreign direct
investment has been directed to the country’s petroleum sector and that these
investments are unlikely to increase local employment. 66 Oil and gas
extraction projects, like those planned in Myanmar, typically do not create
many jobs for local populations.67 This is particularly troublesome because
Myanmar’s unemployment rate hovered around 40% of the population in
2013 and is desperately in need of increased opportunities for job creation
and economic diversification.68 However, as the following section shows,
international investment options may not be preferable for building
64
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economic diversity. In addition, as described in this section, Myanmar
already maintains a capacity to increase economic diversification without
using SWFs and recently passed legislation that will assist foreign direct
investment opportunities in the country.69
States have sought to use SWFs to make international investments in a
variety of industries in a top-down approach to diversify domestic
economies. 70 Some countries with unique economic and geographic
conditions have used international investment strategies like SWFs in lieu of
domestic economic diversity with some degree of success, but building a
self-sustaining and diverse, domestic economic base is virtually always
preferable to building a diversified international financial support system.71
This is because building a diverse domestic economy to prevent against
commodity or global shocks is more sustainable than creating an investment
fund to guard against the effects of similar shocks. 72
Myanmar has alternative opportunities for economic diversification
beyond petroleum. Myanmar is the world’s second largest exporter of beans
and pulses after Canada.73 In addition, Myanmar can increase production of
its significant garment, hardwood, and gemstone industries.74 Moreover,
tourism rose sharply from 2011 to 2012, and Myanmar is currently working
on a master tourism plan with the German-based Hans Seidel Foundation
and the ADB to further expand tourism infrastructure and services for the
increasing numbers of tourists expected in the near future.75
Myanmar was also formerly known as the “rice bowl of the world” for
its world-leading rice exports before agricultural productivity was reduced
by the failed “Burmese Way of Socialism” policy. 76 According to the
International Rice Research Institute, Myanmar could improve or regain its
agricultural sector’s former status by expanding farmers’ access to credit,
increasing storage and production facilities, and improving transportation
69
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systems. 77 Improving outputs in most of the above sectors will likely
increase transportation and logistics business opportunities to export
products to market. Resultantly, Myanmar already has a variety of existing
options to expand domestic economic diversity without needing to depend
on a SWF to create an internationally focused financial base.
Recently introduced legislation may offer future opportunities to
expand authentic economic diversity. Myanmar’s 2012 Foreign Direct
Investment Law (“FDI Law”) was signed in 2012 and allows foreign
corporations to retain up to 100% of its investment in Myanmar. 78 In
contrast to Myanmar’s 1988 Foreign Investment Law, the 2012 FDI Law
also allows foreign investors to enter into unrestricted joint ventures. 79
Article 6(a)(2) of the 1988 Foreign Investment Law states, “if a joint venture
is formed the foreign capital shall be at least 35 percent of the total
capital.”80 In addition, the 2012 FDI Law provides land rights previously
absent in the 1988 Foreign Investment Law.81 Under this revision, “[Section
31]: The Commission may allow the investor the actually required period of
the right to lease or use land up to initial 50 years depending upon the
category of business, industry and the volume of investment.” 82
Furthermore, Section 32 states that foreign investors “may extend the period
[a] consecutive 10 years and for further 10 years after the expiry of such
period . . . after the expiry of the term permitted under section 31 . . . .”83
This seventy year time-frame is particularly attractive for capital intensive,
long-term building projects, like hotels or factories.
The 2012 FDI Law also supports job creation by requiring investors to
hire an increasing number of Myanmar nationals over the first six years of
corporate operations. According to Chapter XI, Section 24(a), “citizens shall
have been appointed at least 25 percent within the first two-year[s], at least
50 percent within the second two-year[s] and at least 75 percent within the
third two-year[s] from the year of commencement of the business.” 84
Importantly, the 2012 FDI Law’s Section 28 also “guarantees that a business
formed under the permit shall not be nationalized within the term of contract
77
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or the extended term if such term is extended.”85 Although the 1988 Foreign
Investment Law also included this provision, it is wise for the government to
guarantee that nationalization practices once prevalent during the Burmese
way of Socialism era will not once again be employed during the country’s
rapid increase in foreign investment.86
Lastly, in July 2013, Myanmar’s parliament, the Pyihtaungsu Hluttaw,
signaled that it would accept President Thein Sein’s push to join the World
Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”) to extend
greater guarantees and assistance to foreign investors.87 The combination of
the above-mentioned legal reforms in the 2012 FDI Law and the steps to
increase foreign investment guarantees will increase domestic investment
opportunities and economic diversification.
Myanmar policymakers should also recognize that SWFs do not
consistently achieve economic diversification goals. A 2007 IMF report
found that “the more reliant a country is on one commodity, the less
effective its SWF is in achieving its goals.”88 Venezuela’s SWF, the National
Development Fund, is a shining example of this dependency. The Fund,
more commonly known as the Fonden Fund, was created to allocate oil
revenues separate from the national budget and help diversify Venezuela’s
economy.89 Aside from being a glaring instance of corruption, discussed in
a subsequent section of this article,90 Fonden has actually contributed to
Venezeula’s increased dependence on oil exports, from 80% ten years ago to
96% of exports in 2012. 91
Some states have also made internal investments with SWFs to
improve domestic diversification. One example of internal investment with
SWFs is Angola’s petroleum-funded Fundo Soberano de Angola, designed to
make targeted domestic investments in infrastructure projects and the
hospitality industry.92
However, Myanmar should note that internal investment strategies
with SWFs are so risky that some states have prohibited their SWFs from
85
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making similar domestic investments. Norway’s SWF, the Norwegian
Government Pension Fund Global (“NGPG”), is a leading example of SWF
good governance and expressly prohibits investment in “infrastructure such
as roads, railways, harbours, airports, and other basic infrastructure” in
Chapter 3, Section 3-1(3) of its incorporating Investment Mandate93 because
“domestic recycling of surplus risks fanning inflation and discourag[es]
competitiveness.”94
Additionally, the ability for SWFs to increase and advance research
and development through foreign investments is limited. Deloitte, a global
consulting firm, found that SWFs can, “move up the value curve quickly as
they acquire legal rights to intellectual property and access to research,
design, and development that may take years to develop at home.” 95
However, acquisition of intellectual property does not simultaneously train
personnel to apply intellectual property, and funds “do not offer an
alternative to developing a capable and active workforce” 96 Therefore,
investing in foreign companies using SWFs to obtain legal intellectual
property rights would be of little consequence for Myanmar’s vastly
undertrained workforce unless local workers receive the extensive training
needed to utilize that technology towards domestic commercial operations.97
Ultimately, Myanmar has existing and forecasted opportunities to
develop economic diversification without a SWF.
B.

Macroeconomic Stabilization

Sovereign wealth funds are often tasked with offsetting negative
macroeconomic effects associated with the resource curse, including the
need to manage inflation risk stemming from foreign currency exchange
rates and stabilize commodity price volatility.98 However, using SWFs to
93
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mitigate macroeconomic problems depends on preexisting institutional
financial and fiscal capacities, described in Section I, that Myanmar
currently lacks. Furthermore, devoting resources to SWF stabilization
efforts can detract funds from building a genuine diversified domestic base
that can serve as a natural guard against future macroeconomic challenges.99
1.

Inflation and Exchange Rate Stability

Large and sudden profits collected from the sale of resources can
trigger a phenomenon known as “Dutch Disease.”100 Named after the 1960s
Dutch economic crisis, which was caused by the discovery of natural gas in
the North Sea, Dutch Disease occurs when countries experience sharp
increases in foreign currency, often as a result of extractive resource
projects.101 The influx of foreign capital causes the real exchange rate to
rapidly appreciate followed by wage inflation.102 Increased domestic costs
then make manufactured products more expensive and less competitive in
the global marketplace because trading partners are forced to pay higher
costs for the same products as a result of purchasing goods with a more
expensive currency.103
Sovereign wealth funds focused on currency stabilization can help
manage currency exchange rate stability to prevent inflation by investing
foreign exchange reserves in short-term, liquid assets that grant states the
flexibility to buy or sell their own currency on international markets and
maintain a preferable exchange rate relative to a global base currency. 104
However, a study regarding SWF Dutch Disease conducted by the
Australian Industry Group, an industry group representing over 60,000
Australian businesses, found that SWFs can assist stabilization, but cannot
insulate economies from currency appreciation alone and should be
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complemented by structural legal reforms to tax systems, labor practices,
and competition policies.105
As argued in this paper, Myanmar presently lacks the legal and
structural abilities to complement potential SWF’s activities similar to the
recommendations by the Australian Industry Group. In November 2013, the
World Bank estimated that Myanmar’s economy would grow by 6.8% in
2014 due to energy extraction, foreign direct investment, and construction
projects.106 Should inflation rise to critical levels as a result of increased
petroleum and non-petroleum related foreign direct investment, Myanmar’s
government should explore traditional monetary policies and build a
domestic base for sustainable and diversified economic growth before
creating a SWF as a safety net to protect against stability fluctuations.107
2.

Commodity Price Volatility

Commodity price volatility is a large component of the resource curse.
States that are dependent on commodity revenue, like petroleum resources,
are vulnerable to sharp market shifts because such a large percentage of their
state income relies on strong global prices for these resources. As a result,
when global prices shift, commodity dependent states may realize annual
windfall profits or suffer massive budgetary crises.108 Similar to lessons
from the Papua New Guinea MRSF’s failures, exampled above, establishing
clear legal frameworks for SWF management can provide more dependable
estimates of how much resource revenue is available to fund annual
government spending.
Trinidad and Tobago’s Heritage Stabilization Fund (“HSF”),
established in 2000 and financed with petroleum revenues, is an example of
how guiding legislation can be implemented to mitigate commodity price
volatility.109 The HSF’s founding legislation, cited below, clearly outlines
the SWF’s purpose and goals:
105
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. . . [Section 3] (2) The purpose of the Fund is to save and invest
surplus petroleum revenues derived from production business to
–
(a) cushion the impact on or sustain public expenditure capacity
during periods of revenue downturn whether caused by a fall in
prices of crude oil or natural gas; (b) generate an alternate
stream of income so as to support public expenditure capacity
as a result of revenue downturn caused by the depletion of nonrenewable petroleum resources; and (c) provide a heritage for
future generations, of citizens of Trinidad and Tobago from
savings and investment income derived from the excess
petroleum revenues.110
In meeting goals to protect against commodity price shocks, the Fund
established an eleven-year average consisting of the past five years, a
forecast of the current year, and incorporates expectations of the next five
years in Section 13(3).111 Doing so legislates a general price level for the
government to use when calculating spending forecasts and limits inherent
risks by smoothing prices needed for annual speculation of a volatile
commodity.112 Importantly, the HSF’s guiding legislation also includes an
expressed guard against unsustainable withdrawals.113 According to Section
15(3), “no withdrawal may be made from the Fund in any financial year,
where the balance standing to the credit of the Fund would fall below one
billion dollars in the currency of the United States of America, if such
withdrawal were to be made.”114
All together, the HSF’s strategy paid off handsomely in 2008. The
Fund previously set its estimates of oil prices at USD 45 per barrel in
2007.115 In 2008, oil’s global price sharply rose and Trinidad and Tobago
gained an additional USD 3 billion, or eleven percent of the country’s GDP,
compared to previous estimates.116
Petroleum commodities are highly volatile,117 and a realistic barrel
price drop in 2008 could have sharply reduced the profits available to
110
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Trinidad and Tobago. Trinidad and Tobago was able to avoid this risk by
prudently establishing legal frameworks to govern the fund and by applying
financial management practices to its operations.118 However, as previously
discussed,119 Myanmar has yet to demonstrate its ability to apply similar
responsible legal or financial practices. As a result, the HSF can provide
valuable lessons for fund management, but Myanmar must build the legal
and financial oversight practices that contributed to the HSF’s success to
enable itself to share the same rewards.
Lastly, while states like Trinidad and Tobago have found some success
with SWF stability operations,120 a 2007 report commissioned by the IMF
found little evidence that SWFs in natural resource exporting states were
able to “smooth out” commodity volatility between times of strong and weak
commodity prices.121 This was partially attributable to independent SWFs
acting disconnected from state financial decision-makers. 122
Economic diversification should be the primary recipient of finite
revenue rather than creating a financial buffer against volatility caused by
not diversifying domestic economies. Therefore, policymakers should not
view the creation of a Myanmar SWF as a panacea for the deeper problems
of commodity price volatility.
C.

Intergenerational Justice & Savings

Intergenerational justice, also known as intergenerational equity,
refers to efforts to ensure future generations can share benefits from the
country’s limited non-renewable resources. 123 These benefits can be
preserved physical deposits, funds set aside for future expenses, or public
institutions financed with resource wealth.124 As a result, a SWF may ensure
intergenerational justice concerns are met prior to approving additional
extractive projects. 125
Revenue collected from extracting non-renewable resources is only a
change in the physical nature of a state’s existing assets and does not
118
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represent new income for countries.126 As a result, the monetization of nonrenewable resources underlines the need to ensure intergenerational justice
prior to approving extractive projects. The goal of intergenerational justice
is to ensure that future generations are able to share the benefits of a
country’s non-renewable resources.127 One way to pursue this goal is to save
a portion of the resource revenue until more developed governance practices
can guide spending priorities.128 However, there are problems with this
strategy.
In countries with poor governance histories, like Myanmar, there is no
guarantee that future spending decisions will be guided by wiser decision
makers. In addition, SWFs are not guaranteed to yield future profits. Lastly,
since SWFs can be raided as “rainy day” funds, described in detail below,
one must question whether state revenue invested in a SWF better
contributes to national building than investments in state and social services.
In light of these realities, some commentators have proposed ring fencing a
portion of state revenues from extractive projects in SWFs for future
generations. 129 In this scheme, extractive projects could commence and
provide limited funding for present-day government spending while also
saving a portion of non-renewable resource revenue until future generations
and leaders can responsibly guide government spending priorities.130
International civil society organizations have advocated for Myanmar
to refrain from approving additional natural resource extraction projects until
good governance, human rights, and environmental best practices emerge to
more responsibly manage extractive revenues from these projects.131 This is
a sensible course of action to preserve resources and revenue for future
generations, but it is understandable why cash-starved states like Myanmar
would be reluctant to pause or cancel multi-billion dollar international
agreements needed to fund government operations.
Ultimately, while people may hope that governance only improves
over time, there is no guarantee that tomorrow’s leaders will be better
126
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equipped to manage state resources for national benefit. Authors Robert
Carling and Stephen Kircher argue that government savings are deferred
future government spending and found no basis to assume that investment
decisions will be more “correct” in the future regardless of the virtuousness
of new ruling parties.132 Myanmar’s current political leadership is limited in
its technical, legal, and financial expertise. 133 Additionally, Myanmar’s
rising opposition party, the National League for Democracy (“NLD”), is
composed of the same individuals mentioned in Section I, who are not yet
any more legally or financially qualified to responsibly allocate funds in the
future should the party continue its ascension into leadership roles. 134
Even SWFs with expert guidance are not guaranteed to fulfill
intergenerational justice obligations or serve as a final benchmark necessary
to allow additional extractive activities.135 As a result, Myanmar must weigh
its commitment to preserving resources and revenues for future generations
prior to establishing a SWF.
Moreover, despite previously discussed pressures for domestic
management, onlookers may instead suggest that SWFs be managed by
foreign experts who can be trusted to make responsible decisions with
SWFs. This logic also depends on substantial assumptions. Even when
managed by external legal and financial expertise, SWFs are not
fundamentally guaranteed to yield profits due to economic downturns or
poor management decisions. 136
Norway’s SWF, the NGPG, is considered a world-class example of
good governance, transparency, and fund management. 137 However, in
2008, the fund was not immune from the global financial crisis and lost 23%
of its value, or approximately USD 100 billion.138 Moreover, funds can
suffer even under the expert management of world leading financial services
providers. In 2007, Goldman Sachs lost 98% of Libya’s USD 1.3 billion
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SWF.139 Furthermore, in 2011, even after the worst of the financial crisis,
Bahrain’s USD 9 billion fund lost USD 717 million.140
Lastly, SWFs meant to be saved for future generations have
occasionally been used as “rainy day” funds during state emergencies.141 As
mentioned above, following the global financial crisis, Ireland was forced to
take EUR 17.5 billion (USD 23.1 billion) from its SWF, the National
Reserve Pensions Fund, and its additional cash reserves as part of its broader
European Union (“EU”) bailout package.142 Similarly, in 2011, Portugal
raided EUR 5.6 billion (USD 7.4 billion) from its pension fund to meet EU
and IMF fiscal targets.143
Given Myanmar’s previously described lack of fiscal discipline,
onlookers should be skeptical that Myanmar would be able to resist similar
fund usage in situations where well-governed Organization for Economic
Co-Operation and Development (“OECD”) countries have not, given
governmental realities described throughout this paper. Countries like
Myanmar should establish a safety net against unexpected crises and
emergencies, but countries should also be mindful that funds in a SWF will
likely be the first target in future fiscal emergencies.
Investment is based on a tolerance for risk, and these critiques do not
advocate against investing resource wealth solely because of inherent
downside risks. Instead, these examples merely emphasize that SWFs, even
under expert guidance, are not guaranteed to yield profits. Accordingly,
countries like Myanmar must decide whether investments with a SWF are
better uses of state revenue than investments in state and social services that
can otherwise contribute to nation building.
D.

Opportunity Cost

Opportunity cost is an economic term that describes the cost of
pursuing one decision and forgoing another.144 Policymakers must consider
139
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the opportunity cost of investing revenue abroad in a SWF over the benefits
of making investments in the local economy to expand domestic growth and
provide social services.
Similar to the aforementioned concerns about capital loss or
destruction, SWFs can also underperform compared against other options
available to governments. 145 A team of researchers evaluating Australia’s
Future Fund found that the Fund had a negative 0.3% return compared to
investing in standard government ninety day bank bills, essentially
questioning Australia’s decision to invest in a SWF at all.146
Alaska’s SWF has recognized the need to assess opportunity costs in
its founding legislation. In recognition of the need for diversification,
Section 37.13.120 of Alaska’s Permanent Fund (“APF”) founding law states:
(c) The board shall maintain a reasonable diversification among
investments unless, under the circumstances, it is clearly
prudent not to do so. The board shall invest the assets of the
fund in in-state investments to the extent that in-state
investments are available and if the in-state investments (1)
have a risk level and expected return comparable to alternate
investment opportunities . . . .147
This distinction is not prevalent in all SWF founding legislation and
Alaska’s SWF defines its opportunity cost assessment slightly differently
than some other SWFs’ specifications for maximizing investments. For
example, the NGPG specifies in the opening section of its Investment
Mandate that “[section 1-2(3)] the bank shall seek to achieve the highest
possible return after costs . . .”148 and that “[section 3-5(9)] [the] real estate
portfolio shall be well diversified in geography, and over sectors, properties,
and instruments.” 149 The APF and the NGPG are leading global examples
of good governance, so while this particular divergence in language is
modest, both examples emphasize the need to include provisions for
opportunity cost assessments in fund legislation.
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A variety of literature has also explored the benefits of funding
domestic projects with extractive revenue in the present. A report by the
Revenue Watch Institute found that domestic investments funded by
extractive revenue, such as increasing domestic skills, health, or security,
may have higher social rates of return compared to SWF assets that are
“sterilized abroad and therefore [make domestic investments] a better way to
transfer wealth across generations.”150 The same report also cites two other
reports of particular relevance to Myanmar. First, one report found in 2004
that countries with low capital stock earn greater benefits from spending oil
wealth on present-day public spending needs rather than saving for the
future. 151 Second, the report cites a study by Frederick Van der Ploeg and
Anthony J. Venables that indicates that countries should only establish a
SWF after accelerating state development with accumulations of public and
private capital or risk stunting growth.152 These examples demonstrate the
negative opportunity cost of a country like Myanmar investing extractive
revenue in a SWF at the present time.
Furthermore, a World Bank report on the use of domestic investments
with SWFs argues general public investment can be categorized as either
investments that seek financial returns, or investments in “broader economic
or social terms.”153 In clarifying these social terms, the article acknowledges
that “[s]ome worthy investments might have no direct financial returns at all,
and may instead require years of recurrent spending to realize a value for the
country.” 154 Early childhood education is one example of this type of longterm recurrent cost. 155 As a result, the same report argues that SWFs are
meant to serve the primary function of generating profit, and therefore,
“should not invest in projects that are justified primarily by their economic
or social externalities.156 Such investments should be funded through the
normal budget process, which should also make provision for the future
recurrent costs necessary for operations and maintenance.”157
150
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Myanmar is a country already in crisis after decades of poor economic
management and, “the opportunity cost of saving for future challenges when
Myanmar already exhibits extensive symptoms of state failure . . . is not in
Myanmar’s social or economic best interests.” 158 As a result, per the urging
of the World Bank report above, Myanmar should fund all social spending
through standard budgetary processes rather than by creating a SWF to do
the same.
E.

Social Contract

Falling victim to the resource curse can erode the “social contract”
between governments and citizens. The term social contract refers to the
public’s consent to be governed and pay taxes in return for their
government’s provision of various social and security services.159 In theory,
government leaders are then held accountable to citizens for the proper
allocation of taxes and the provision of services.160 However, dependence
on resource revenues can reduce or eliminate the need for public tax
collection and therefore can undermine the accountability of public
officials.161 Sovereign wealth funds have been proposed to assist efforts to
repair broken social contracts using dividend payments to populations.162
The APF is one example of a SWF dividend payment system.163 However, a
similar SWF dividend system may not be the optimal use of all SWFs, and
Myanmar presently lacks the preexisting legal and managerial capacities that
account for the APF’s success with dividend payments.
A recent publication by the Center for Global Development
recognized this problem and suggested that SWFs could be established to
repair social contracts in states suffering from the resource curse. 164 The
article argues that SWFs can collect resource profits then make cash
transfers directly to citizens as a way to build social contracts.165 Transfers,
also known as dividends, could provide citizens a share of resource profits
158
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while creating taxable income. Taxed income could then function as the
basis for the public to hold officials accountable for providing services.166
The use of SWFs to provide individual dividends, rather than funding
a pension system to individuals, is currently in practice in Alaska.167 The
APF receives 25% of revenues from the state’s oil resources and has grown
in value from its initial deposit of USD 734,000 in 1977 to over USD 40
billion in 2012. 168 The APF provides annual payments to all Alaskan
residents and in 2012 the Fund paid an annual dividend of USD 878.169
Alaska’s dividend arrangement is designed to fit the state’s specific
needs, and multiple legislative components enshrined in Alaska’s
constitution are directly responsible for the APF’s success while also
providing SWF good governance standards, as outlined below.170 First,
Sections 37.13.020, 37.13.40, and 37.13.050 clearly outline the APF’s goals,
the composition of the Fund’s controlling structure, and the qualifications of
the APF’s board of trustees, respectively. 171 Second, investment
responsibilities are clearly and extensively defined in Section 37.13.120.172
Third, similar to strict allocation rules present in Trinidad and Tobago’s
166
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Heritage Stabilization Fund, the APF ensures fund sustainability by
legislating that “[i]ncome available for distribution equals 21 percent of the
net income of the fund for the last five fiscal years, including the fiscal year
just ended, but may not exceed net income of the fund for the fiscal year just
ended plus the balance in the earnings reserve account . . . .”173 Lastly, the
law’s Reports and Publications section sets out transparency guidelines in
explicit detail, not present in many other SWF laws. One such transparency
example is the following requirement:
By September 30 of each year, the board shall publish a report
of the fund for distribution to the governor and the public. The
board shall notify the legislature that the report is available.
The report shall be written in easily understandable language.
The report must include financial statements audited by
independent outside auditors, a statement of the amount of
money received by the fund from each investment during the
period covered, a statement of investments of the fund
including an appraisal at market value, a description of fund
investment activity during the period covered by the report, a
comparison of the fund performance with the intended goals
contained in AS 37.13.020,…recommendations of any needed
changes, and any other information the board believes would be
of interest to the governor, the legislature, and the public. The
annual income statement and balance sheet of the fund shall be
published in at least one newspaper in each judicial district.174
The APF attributes its own success to its creation through a state
constitutional amendment, strong legislative oversight, public transparency,
sound management practices (including managerial performance
evaluations), internal consensus, public consent, and the prohibition against
using the Fund as a development fund.175 However, establishing a social
contract is notably not one of the APF’s goals.
The concept of SWF dividend payments has also received sharp
criticism in academia, thereby raising questions of whether Myanmar should
use a SWF to implement a dividend-based method for developing a social
173

Id. § 37.13.140.
Id. § 37.13.170.
175
Frequently Asked Questions, ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORPORATION, http://www.apfc.org/
home/Content/aboutFund/fundFAQ.cfm. (last visited May 23, 2014).
174

JUNE 2014

EVALUATING A MYANMAR SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND

607

contract. 176 Distributing dividend payments instead of reinvesting wealth
reduces the amount of money that could be invested with a SWF. 177
Moreover, dividend payments disregard intergenerational justice concerns
because profits shared individually in the present deplete resources and
neglect to provide benefits to future citizens. Lastly, providing dividend
payments and spreading wealth within the country essentially negate antiDutch Disease effects that SWFs in resource-dependent states are often
established to originally mitigate.178
Logistically, it is also unclear how dividend payments in Myanmar
could be expanded to cover additional taxable income and create a
sustainable taxation system. According to Sean Turnell, Myanmar’s tax
system is “disorganized, arbitrary, and extraordinarily inefficient at raising
revenues,” and taxes are often collected in an unofficial manner from local
authorities.179 Given Myanmar’s inability to efficiently collect money from
its citizens, one must be skeptical of the government’s ability to do the
reverse and effectively provide money to its citizens. Without expanding
legitimate taxable income beyond dividend payments, taxes collected on
these transfers would simply be overstated prior to tax collection.
Citizens would not likely object to receiving a share of resource
profits, but this process could create a dependence on the government’s
provision of revenue that might fluctuate over time given petroleum
commodities’ high price volatility.180 Alarmingly, this dependence could
then duplicate price volatility problems on a household level if individuals
build personal budgets based on government dividend payments that
fluctuate without warning.
Myanmar presently lacks the preexisting legal and managerial
capacities that account for the APF’s success with dividend payments.
Establishing a similar dividend-paying fund to rebuild a broken social
contract would not create accountable governance institutions in Myanmar.
Ultimately, Myanmar must demonstrate its commitment to governance and
transparency best practices while legitimizing its existing tax collection
system to strengthen its social contract with its citizens. This process cannot
be shortcut with a SWF.
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Conflict

Decisions to establish a SWF require a degree of political consensus
to agree on fund objectives, determine allocation levels, and mandate how
investment funds can be withdrawn. Achieving political consensus depends
on agreement between domestic political factions, public discourse
permitting the use of state resources, and an equitable system for distributing
wealth. Unfortunately, Myanmar’s domestic political divisions between the
military and the NLD, its inability to freely gauge public opinion regarding
resources in which all citizens share a stake, and inequitable distribution of
wealth, create sources of conflict that raise the question of whether
Myanmar is presently prepared to forge the consensus needed to establish a
SWF.181
1.

Domestic Political Divisions

Existing domestic political support for creating a SWF is essential for
establishing SWF objectives, allocating funding levels, and outlining
withdrawal policies. As a result, political divisions must be recognized prior
to establishing a fund.182 The situations in Chad, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe,
described below, demonstrate that a lack of political consensus can endanger
a SWF. Similarly, Myanmar has unsettled political divisions, notably a
military that is unwilling to relinquish control and a critical election in 2015
that may re-orient the country’s political landscape.183
The Republic of Chad is a leading example of what can happen when
SWFs fail to recognize changing political interests prior to their creation. In
1999, the World Bank mandated that Chad legislate clear governance
standards for the country’s oil revenues prior to receiving World Bank
financing and guarantees towards a 650-mile, USD 4.1 billion pipeline to
Cameroon. 184 In meeting these obligations, Article 1 of the Revenue
Management Plan defined the specific petroleum projects that would provide
revenue to special investment funds, and Article 3 ensured a layer of
international oversight by specifying that, “[resources] shall be deposited
181
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into special accounts of an international financing institution opened in the
name of the Republic of Chad and referred to as the offshore escrow
accounts.”185
Following their creation, the escrow accounts were held in a Citibank
account in London under the guidance of the World Bank and an
independent body of experts.186 Furthermore, Article 9 stipulated that, “[t]he
10% remainder of the direct resources, royalties and dividends mentioned in
Article 3 of this Law shall be deposited in a Savings Account opened in an
international financing institution on behalf of future generations, in
accordance with the rules of the Bank of the Central African States
(BEAC).”187 This law was then passed by Chad’s National Assembly and
signed by President Deby.
Five years later, Chad’s President Deby leveraged his own political
connections and existing political divisions in the country to successfully
circumvent layers of built-in fund protection by championing subsequent
amendments to overhaul the fund’s predetermined annual payout structures.
188
In opposition to the World Bank, President Deby scrapped Article 9’s
provision of funds set aside for intergenerational equity concerns and
proposed legislation that doubled the percentage of petroleum revenue that
could be spent without oversight.189 In addition, the President designated the
military and judiciary as priority sectors in need of the Fund’s reserves,
thereby reducing shared funding to poverty reduction initiatives. 190
Thereafter, President Deby branded the World Bank’s opposition to these
changes as foreign efforts to attack Chad’s national sovereignty and
succeeded in getting his revisions passed by the National Assembly with 119
votes in favor to 13 votes opposed.191
Nigeria has also encountered related difficulties reaching political
consensus over the management of their proposed SWFs. Nigeria recently
allocated an initial contribution of USD 1 billion to launch an oil-funded
SWF. Immediately thereafter, thirty-six state governors filed court
185
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submissions to block the SWF’s creation because annual payouts would
decrease the pool of oil profits distributed to individual states and because
the governors did not trust the leaders in control of the fund. 192
In addition, political divisions may complicate planning for which
government branch should oversee a SWF. For example, Zimbabwe’s main
political parties, Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
(“ZANU-PF”) and Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) were formerly
deadlocked about which state ministry should house its proposed SWF.193
Zimbabwe has been governed by an acrimonious power-sharing agreement
between ZANU-PF and MDC that was brokered by international parties
following a streak of election violence in 2008.194 Since that time, these
political parties have divided control over different branches of government
until President Mugabe and the ZANU-PF party claimed victory in a 2013
election condemned as illegitimate by Western governments.195 At the time
of publication, it is unclear whether a compromise similar to the 2008
agreement will arise to divide government powers. As a result, the ministry
that houses a potential SWF would determine which political party can set
spending priorities with that amount of the country’s resource wealth.
Myanmar has similar political divisions that must be resolved prior to
establishing a SWF. First, Myanmar’s most recent 2008 constitution
establishes a set number of military seats in Myanmar’s parliament, the
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.196 According to Chapter 109, “The Pyithu Hluttaw197
shall be formed with a maximum of 440 Hluttaw representatives…(b) not
more than 110 Pyithu Hluttaw representatives who are the Defence Services
personnel nominated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services in
accord with the law.” 198 Similarly, Chapter 141 states, “The Amyotha
Hluttaw 199 shall be formed with a maximum of 224 Hluttaw
192
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representatives . . . [and] (b) 56 Amyotha Hluttaw representatives who are
the Defence Services personnel nominated by the Commander-in-Chief of
the Defence Services in accord with the law.”200 Together, these articles
guarantee the military 25% of elected seats in parliament.201 Despite the
NLD’s previous success winning parliament seats in the 2012 election, the
military has expressed its unwillingness to relinquish control and believes it
must “safeguard” ongoing reforms.202
In addition, Myanmar is approaching a critical election in 2015 that
has the potential to reorient the country’s political landscape. Even after her
release from house arrest and her election to parliament, Nobel-laureate,
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, is currently barred from running for president under
Chapter 59(f) of the 2008 Myanmar constitution on the basis that “one of
their legitimate children or their spouses not owe allegiance to a foreign
power, not be subject of a foreign power or citizen of a foreign country.” 203
Suu Kyi’s two adult-aged children are British citizens and were raised in the
United Kingdom by Suu Kyi’s deceased husband, Michael Ayers.204 This
provision is highly criticized by pro-democracy forces in Myanmar because
it unjustly targets Suu Kyi to prevent her and the NLD from leading
additional progressive reforms.205 However, in March 2013, The Irrawaddy,
an online news publication focused on Myanmar, reported that two former
military generals who are current members of parliament proposed
amending Myanmar’s constitution to remove restrictions on Suu Kyi from
serving as president.206 These revisions are still pending at the time of this
article’s publication.
Lastly, in April 2012, Suu Kyi’s political party, the NLD, won fortythree out of forty-four parliament seats in national by-elections.207 If the
NLD continues its parliamentary success as expected, the country could
potentially be governed by a broad number of new representatives each with
their own interests for how to manage resource profits. 208 As a result,
200
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establishing long-term financial planning tools, such as a SWF, should at
least wait until after the next election in order to reasonably gauge prevailing
political opinions about the necessity of creating a fund and defining its
investment objectives. 209
2.

Public Consent

Public opinion and consent should be incorporated into state decisions
for approving extractive projects and setting spending priorities with project
profits. Resource revenue is a country’s birthright and citizens should have
an unencumbered ability to express their opinions on how national public
property is allocated.210 While communication systems have become more
accessible in 2013, only 1% of the country has reliable Internet access and
approximately only 5% of the population uses mobile phones. 211
Resultantly, without alternative technology, public assembly remains a
primary, basic form of public discourse in Myanmar. Therefore, Myanmar’s
new era of legislative reforms should ensure support for freedoms to
assemble, express public opinions, and consent to extractive projects before
extractive projects are approved. 212 However, two overarching problems,
described in detail below, stand in the way of unhindered public consent:
Myanmar’s existing legislation does not protect these internationally
recognized freedoms, and Myanmar lacks or inconsistently meets its
obligations to implement international treaties.
In July 2012, the government of Myanmar passed the Decree on the
Right to Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession (“the Decree”).213 This
law is one of Myanmar’s first examples of civil rights legislation following
the country’s recent political reforms.214 However, civil society groups have
criticized the Decree because it lacks sufficient protections for basic
209
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freedoms of expression or assembly and creates burdensome requirements
for organizing demonstrations.215 In addition, the Decree also breaks from
international best practice by allowing the state to prohibit public gatherings,
vaguely defined as situations “if the security of the State, rule of law, public
tranquility and the existing laws protecting the public are to be breached.” 216
Lengthy application requirements set in Chapter 2(1) also state that a
person who wants to exercise either the right to peaceful assembly or
peaceful procession must apply for the permission at least five days in
advance. 217 Moreover, Chapter 3 sets out thirteen lengthy administrative
processes necessary to obtain a permit and navigate appeals.218 Lastly, the
Decree places unrealistic levels of personal liability on event organizers by
requiring, “the main applicant or organization must take the responsibilities
of all attendees during, either, the peaceful assembly or peaceful procession
or the peaceful assembly and peaceful procession is carrying out in
accordance with the permission granted.”219
Myanmar has also used Penal Code 505(b) to prohibit peaceful public
demonstrations even as recently as June 2013. 220 Outlining the harsh
penalties from violating what is otherwise an accepted human right, Penal
Code 505(b)’s harsh punish states,
Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement, rumour
or report . . . (b) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause
fear or alarm to the public or to any section of the public
whereby any person may be induced to commit an offense
against the State or against the public tranquility . . . shall be
punished with imprisonment which may extend to two years, or
with fine, or with both.221
Myanmar is similarly failing to meet its obligations to implement
international human rights treaties that would enhance good governance
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practices and protect freedoms of assembly and expression.222 In a 2013
assessment of rule of law in Myanmar, a group of international pro-bono
legal advisors found that Myanmar’s government has, “performed no
assessment regarding the compatibility of existing Myanmar law with its
obligations under international law,” and that “there remains a substantial
gap between the treaties signed by the Myanmar government and the
implementation of rights protected by the treaties in practice.” 223 Among
the laws listed as incompatible with international obligations and of
relevance to public consent are Myanmar’s Penal Code 505(b), State
Protection Act, and Myanmar’s Code of Criminal Procedure. 224
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (“UDHR”), passed in
1948 by the United Nations General Assembly (“UNGA”), provides
protections for freedom of expression and assembly and is generally
considered a non-binding principle of customary international law for U.N.
member states.225 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”) also protects these rights. 226 However, Myanmar is not a
signatory to the ICCPR or similar treaties protecting human rights. 227
Nonetheless, Myanmar has taken some steps to alleviate these
concerns. In September 2011, President Thein Sein issued Notification No.
34, creating a Myanmar National Human Rights Commission (hereinafter
“the Commission”) tasked with, “promoting and safeguarding fundamental
rights of citizens described in the constitution of the Republic of the Union
of Myanmar.”228 The Commission has taken commendable steps such as
calling for the release of political prisoners and recommending Myanmar
join the ICCPR.229 However, civil society organizations have faulted the
Commission’s noncompliance with the United Nation’s Principles Relating
to the Status of National Human Rights Institutions, otherwise known as the
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“Paris Principles.” 230 The Paris Principles were adopted in 1993 and
establish a set of recommendations for national human rights institutions
(“NHRIs”), among which are recommendations that emphasize the need for
NHRIs to function independently from central government operations in
order to produce untainted assessments of problem areas.231
At the core of the issue, the Commission was established by a
presidential notification, 232 rather than abiding by the Paris Principles’
requirement that “[a] national institution shall be given as broad a mandate
as possible, which shall be clearly set forth in a constitutional or legislative
text, specifying its composition and its sphere of competence [Competencies
and Responsibilities (2)].”233 Therefore, the creation of the Commission is
commendable, but legislating its existence would allay concerns that the
commission can be altered or subject to financial pressure based on future
political desires.
Inadequate access to alternative information, legislation that blocks
freedom of expression and assembly, and noncompliance with international
best practices and treaties effectively limit citizens from publically debating
critical information. Myanmar and international parties must not establish a
SWF before free public discourse can at least have an unrestricted
opportunity to weigh the benefits of creating a fund and define investment
objectives with extractive resource profits.
3.

Equitable Wealth Distribution

States or divisions within a country that depend on their areas’
resource wealth are often cautious about funneling extractive profits into a
national fund because projects may reap local resources without providing
local benefits.234 As a result, countries should clearly articulate the land and
property rights that govern the use of local, state, and federal resources.
230
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The aforementioned example of Nigeria’s state governors petitioning
against creating a SWF due to a decline in regional profit sharing is a prime
example of equitable wealth sharing concerns.235 The Nigeria Sovereign
Investment Authority (“NSIA”) was established in 2011 to manage three
separate SWFs using Nigeria’s oil wealth. 236 Pursuant to the NSIA’s
founding legislation, the initial funds would be “provided by the Federal,
State, Federal Capital Territory, Local Government and Area Council of the
Federation . . . [and] shall be the Naira equivalent of the sum of USD 1
billion. [Part 3, Section 29(1)].”237 In addition, the law stipulates that each
of the government authorities listed above, “shall contribute a percentage of
such initial funding equal to each such Government’s share of Federation
revenue in accordance with the formula stated in the Allocation of Revenue
(Federation Account, etc.) Act [Part 3, Section 29(2)].” 238
Each of Nigeria’s thirty-six state governors, collectively known as the
Nigeria Governors Forum, subsequently went to court to block the SWFs’
creation because these requirements to fund national funds would reduce
revenues to individual states.239 Criticism by the governors is generally
based on two articles in Nigeria’s 1999 constitution. First, Section 80 (1)
states that,
All revenues or other moneys raised or received by the
Federation (not being revenues or other moneys payable under
this Constitution or any Act of the National Assembly into any
other public fund of the Federation established for a specific
purpose) shall be paid into and form one Consolidated Revenue
Fund of the Federation.240
In addition, under Section 162:
(1) The Federation shall maintain a special account to be called
“the Federation Account” into which shall be paid all revenues
collected by the Government of the Federation . . . [and] (3)
235
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Any amount standing to the credit of the Federation Account
shall be distributed among the Federal and State Governments
and the Local Government Councils in each State . . . .241
Taken together, the Nigeria Governors Forum argued that funds may not be
legally deposited into SWFs under the NSIA and that depositing these funds
violated Section 162’s provision of state-level revenue sharing.242 According
to former Lagos State Governor, Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu, Nigeria’s
states are desperately in need of money, and Tinubu has drawn the analogy
that allowing the federal government to save for long term needs at a time of
crisis is similar to not paying for life saving medical treatment for a sick
child because you are saving for their future.243
In May 2013, Nigeria’s Supreme Court heard arguments from the
Federal Government and the Nigeria Governors Forum, and presiding Judge
Walter Onnonoghen commented that, on the issue of revenue sharing, “there
is nothing constitutional about money sharing but negotiation,” thus
recommending that any state revenue sharing must be determined through
state and federal negotiation.244 Judge Onnonoghen urged both sides to
negotiate this point out of court before their next scheduled court appearance
on December 2, 2013. 245
The Nigeria case study highlights constitutional revenue sharing
issues in developing petroleum states; however, even well diversified
Western economies may share these same concerns. Madelaine Drohan, a
Canadian correspondent for The Economist, recently recommended in a
report on SWFs that the Canadian International Council should not establish
a national Canadian SWF because doing so would deny or reduce revenue to
Canada’s individual provinces that are dependent on extractive projects in
those areas.246
Myanmar’s ongoing regional divisions only underline the need to
ensure that extractive projects transfer benefits to local communities else
provide additional reasons for conflict. Kachin State, one of Myanmar’s
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ethnic states with plentiful jade resources, is a notable example.247 In June
2011, a seventeen-year ceasefire broke down between the Kachin
Independence Army and Myanmar’s military and displaced approximately
100,000 people.248 According to Richard Horsey, a former U.N. senior
official in Myanmar, “such vast revenues – in the hands of both sides – have
certainly fed into conflict, helped fund insurgency, and will be a hugely
complicating factor in building a sustainable peace economy.”249
In order to prevent further conflict, basic land rights that intersect with
extractive resource reserves and revenue distribution must be enshrined in
law prior to creating SWFs that may detract critical funds from certain
regions. Of particular note, Myanmar’s constitution and two of Myanmar’s
highly criticized existing land laws, the Farmland Act and the Vacant,
Fallow, and Virgin Lands Management Law (“VFV Law”), both detailed
below, underscore the need to revise the governance of natural resources
before establishing a fund to reap the benefits of local lands.
Myanmar’s constitution clearly restricts ownership of extractive
resources and states,
The [Myanmar] Union: (a) is the ultimate owner of all lands
and all natural resources above and below the ground, above
and beneath the water and in the atmosphere in the Union; [and]
(b) shall enact necessary law to supervise extraction and
utilization of State-owned natural resources by economic forces
[Article 37]. 250
Therefore, on a basic level, regional or state-level profit sharing will remain
limited as long as this provision is intact.
The Farmland Act, enacted in March 2012, affirms the State’s
ownership of all farmland in Myanmar.251 Under the Farmland Act, farmers
must receive permission from the government before they harvest crops,
even on generations-old family land. 252 In addition, the law claims all above
247
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and belowground extractive resources as property of the state without any
profit-sharing provisions for local communities. 253 Lastly, the Farmland Act
also curtails existing legislation that previously allowed partial collective
unionization rights. 254
The VFV Law, also passed in March 2012, grants the government
control over state or regional resources.255 Conditions governing the use of
land include that, “If natural resources are found in the authorized land and
the Government being desirous of extracting the same on a commercial basis
resumes the area required therefrom, it shall be surrendered as directed by
the Union government.”256 In addition, the law also enables the country’s
Central Body of Vacant, Fallow, and Wilderness Land Management to redesignate vacant, fallow, and virgin land as “farmland.” 257 Reclassified
farmland can then be granted to “farmers.” 258
Two critical issues arise from this process. First, a Reuters Special
Report found in 2012 that occupied farmland deliberately left vacant as part
of annual crop cycles, or generational family land without official land titles,
was labeled “vacant” and confiscated by the Myanmar government. 259
Second, the government’s definition of “farmer” is irresponsibly defined to
include state officials, politically connected crony tycoons, and foreign
investors. 260 The government can therefore grant these “farmers” the ability
to develop up to 50,000 acres of “vacant” farmland to develop industrial raw
materials. 261 Alarmingly, if this legal manipulation was not blatant enough,
the government can expropriate land from inhabitants when vaguely defined
“national interests” are at stake, and any traditional farmers who refuse to
leave confiscated land will face prison sentences, fines, or both. 262
Policymakers and citizens should not allow a SWF to make
investments with funds that are inequitably obtained from project areas. As
a result, Myanmar must resolve its land ownership and resource profitsharing disputes before establishing a SWF. Failure to do so can further

253

Id.
Id.
255
The Vacant, Fallow, and Virgin Lands Management Law, 2012, No. 1 (Myan.).
256
The Vacant, Fallow, and Virgin Lands Management Law, 2012, No. 1, ch. 6(16)(g) (Myan.).
257
Examination and Critique of the 2012 Farmland Bill, supra note 251.
258
Id.
259
Jason Szep, Special Report: As Myanmar Reforms, Discontent Grips Countryside, REUTERS (Aug.
9, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/09/us-myanmar-farms-idUSBRE87800V20120809.
260
Examination and Critique of the 2012 Farmland Bill, supra note 251.
261
Id.
262
Szep, supra note 259; Examination and Critique of the 2012 Farmland Bill, supra note 251.
254

620

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 23 NO. 3

detract critical funds from specific regions without providing local benefits
to at-risk populations.
V.

CUTTING THROUGH MYANMAR’S JUNGLE: TRANSPARENCY AND
CORRUPTION

Myanmar is one of the most corrupt and non-transparent countries in
the world.263 In addition, global SWFs have a poor track record at serving as
transparent features of good governance. 264 It follows that mixing
Myanmar’s poor governance record and a SWF in Myanmar raises
considerable governance and transparency concerns. The following section
illustrates the extent of global SWF transparency, and initiatives that may
assist transparency in Myanmar. The section then describes how corruption
in Myanmar’s untransparent environment can impact SWF operations and
overall state governance.
A.

Transparency

Sovereign wealth fund transparency is an important component of
holding governments accountable for national resource revenue. 265
However, even though SWFs control over USD 5.5 trillion of global wealth,
the general lack of transparency regarding SWF size, investment activity,
leadership, and motivations is staggering.266 Lack of SWF transparency
damages state finances and puts government bonds at risk of being
downgraded.267 Myanmar’s historic corruption and poor transparency are
reasons for concern that a Myanmar SWF would fall prey to the institutional
governance and transparency deficiencies that have plagued the Myanmar
ministries. The United States government has recently imposed transparency
requirements for those investing in Myanmar, which may establish a degree
of transparency best practices, but Myanmar should also reform its domestic
legislation to do the same.
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In a recent survey of SWFs, researchers found that seven of the least
transparent global SWFs control approximately half of all SWF holdings,
amounting to several trillion US dollars. 268 Multivariate tests have
demonstrated a “strong and positive correlation between a country’s political
and civil liberties and the quality and transparency of its sovereign wealth
funds.”269 As a result, SWFs in OECD economies typically are considerably
more transparent regarding their operations than SWFs based in non-OECD
or developing countries. 270 This is evident in states like Norway that
maintain strict annual transparency procedures.271 In comparison, however,
the United Arab Emirates’ Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, established in
1976, controls over USD 627 billion of assets and only released limited
information about its financial transactions for the first time in 2010.272
The lack of SWF transparency can also damage the legitimacy of state
finances. Venezuela’s Fonden Fund, previously controlled personally by the
late President Hugo Chavez, lacks congressional oversight and does not
regularly disclose its investments.273 Due to the opaque nature of such a
large percentage of state revenue, Erich Arispe, the director of Fitch Ratings
Sovereign Group, previously commented that, “I can’t rate what I can’t see,”
and signaled that Venezuela’s debt runs the risk of being downgraded
because of fund transparency concerns.274 Downgraded credit raises the cost
of borrowed capital,275 and downgrades such as these can be avoided by
committing to more transparent legal and managerial best practices.276
In addition, Revenue Watch Institute has identified very few cases
when SWFs have increased state transparency, with exceptions in Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan.277 However, these states and their SWFs are governed by
authoritative presidential decrees, so increased transparency has not
268
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necessarily led to increased political openness or public participation in
investment decisions.278
In an effort to increase transparency and establish general best
practices, in 2008, the International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth
Funds (“IWG-SWF”) and the IMF put forward a set of twenty-four
principles for SWF governance. 279 To date, twenty-six nations have
committed to the IWG-SWF principles,280 known as the Santiago Principles.
Among these principles are the requirements that, “the legal framework for
the SWF . . . be sound and support its effective operation”281 and that funds
be, “clear and publicly disclos[e] policies, rules, procedures, or arrangements
in relation to the SWF’s general approach to funding, withdrawal, and
spending operations.”282 Lastly, the Santiago Principles emphasize the need
for SWF operations to be, “clearly defined in the relevant legislation,
charter, other constitutive documents, or management agreement.” 283
However, the voluntary nature of this transparency regime raises
questions about countries’ real commitment to the Santiago Principles. For
example, Nigeria’s NSIA specifically mentions the Santiago Principles in
Part 1, Article 4 (2)(d) of its founding legislation.284 The article stipulates
that
“[t]he
[NSIA] . . . implement[s]
best
practices . . . respect[s]
independence and accountability, corporate governance, transparency and
reporting on performance as provided in this Act, including with due regard
as appropriate for the Santiago Principles.” 285 The NSIA Act does not
define “due regard as appropriate”286 and resultantly the parameters of this
language are far too broad to be truly considered in adherence to the
Santiago Principles. This instance demonstrates that the Santiago Principles
may serve as an effective guideline for fund creation, but do not inherently
provide solutions to transparency concerns.
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Myanmar’s historic corruption and poor transparency practices cast
doubt on the proposition that a Myanmar SWF would escape the institutional
governance and transparency deficiencies that have plagued the Myanmar
ministries that would likely be tasked with overseeing a national SWF. In
fact, EarthRights International, a non-profit organization with an extensive
focus on Myanmar’s extractive industry, found that Myanmar had
unaccounted foreign exchange reserves in excess of hundreds of millions of
US dollars held in two foreign Asian banks in 2009.287 Similar to a potential
SWF, these funds are not included in annual budgets or subject to civil
society oversight.288
More recently, Myanmar has signaled its intention to join international
transparency initiatives to address some of these concerns, and Western
governments have set strict transparency guidelines for national companies
investing in Myanmar. 289 Implementation of these transparency best
practices parallel the current challenges faced in implementing transparency
standards Myanmar would need to overcome before establishing a
transparent national SWF.
In 2012, Myanmar announced that it would become a signatory to the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (“EITI”).290 The EITI is a
voluntary international initiative that requires extractive companies to selfreport payments to foreign governments. 291 Governments then report
payments received from companies to a third party to verify that neither side
has corruptly siphoned revenue.292 The EITI has been applied in thirty-six
other countries, but experts and civil society groups have expressed concern
that Myanmar may fail to adequately meet multiple core objectives of the
EITI. 293 In particular, concerns that Myanmar may fail to meet these
objectives partially stems from EITI Requirement 4, which requires that:
287
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(a) . . . implementation of the EITI is overseen by a multistakeholder group comprising appropriate stakeholders,
including—but not limited to—the private sector, civil society
(including independent civil society groups and other civil
society, such as the media and parliamentarians) and relevant
government ministries . . . (d) Civil society groups involved in
the EITI as members of the multi-stakeholder group must be
operational, and, in policy terms, independent of government
and/or companies . . . [and] (e) Members of the multistakeholder group should be able to operate freely without
restraint or coercion, including be liaising with their
constituency groups.294
Myanmar’s poor track record of encouraging civil liberties or enabling
civil society activities may result in an inability to meet authentic multistakeholder requirements as set forth in the EITI. 295 This is particularly
problematic because EITI Requirement 4.1(a) tasks those multi-stakeholder
groups to, “define, by agreement of the multi-stakeholder group, what these
material payments and revenues comprise and what constitutes a predefined, reasonable materiality threshold.” 296 Therefore, the inability to
forge authentic multi-stakeholder groups will prevent an authentic definition
of what activities are considered material payments to governments, thereby
potentially allowing an unobservable amount of corrupt revenue to continue
flowing from extractive projects.
In addition to the EITI’s international focus on extractive
transparency, U.S. President Barack Obama recently praised Myanmar for
the country’s commitment to join the Open Government Partnership
Initiative (“OGP”), a separate international transparency body, by 2016 in
his speech at the University of Yangon.297 The OGP is a global organization
that aims to make governments more accountable, transparent, and effective
to each country’s citizens through regularly released data and continuous
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engagements with international parties and civil society groups.298 Similar
to the EITI, global commentators remain cautiously optimistic that Myanmar
can fulfill transparency obligations under the OGP.299
Furthermore, American transparency requirements for investing in
Myanmar may establish a degree of transparency best practices, 300 but
Myanmar must consider the merits of enacting similar domestic legislation
prior to creating a responsibly managed SWF. Over the objections of Aung
San Suu Kyi, in July 2012, President Obama announced that American
companies would be allowed to invest in Myanmar and the country’s
extractive sector.301 Following this decision, the U.S. Treasury Department
issued General License 17, which allows investment in Myanmar contingent
on satisfying conditions released under the “Responsible Investment
Reporting Requirements (OMB No. 1405-0209).”302 This license requires
U.S. individuals to report any investment with the Myanmar Oil and Gas
Enterprise (“MOGE”), a military controlled agency focused on petroleum
reserves. 303 In addition, Requirement 8 further forces a degree of
transparency by setting a low basic payment materiality threshold when
requiring that investors must:
report total payments made by submitter or on its behalf valued
over $10,000 during the reporting year to each Government of
Burma entity and/or any sub-national or administrative
governmental entity or non-state group that possesses or claims
to possess governmental authority over the submitter’s new
investment activities in Burma. 304
Furthermore, the license requires releasing two annual reports
regarding investment: one eight-point report for public consumption and a
298
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second report for confidential government use. 305 The more comprehensive,
confidential second report includes the eight points required by the
publically disclosed report and also requires disclosing:
9. Point of Contact: Name and contact information of
individuals(s) responsible for preparing this report. The U.S.
Government may request additional or clarifying
information.306
10. Military Communications: Has the submitter, or any
individual from or representing the submitter, had meetings or
other communications, including written and telephone
communication, with the armed forces of Burma and/or other
armed groups related to the submitter’s investments in
Burma?307
11. Risk Prevention and Mitigation: With regard to human
rights, worker rights, anti-corruption, and/or environmental
issues, summarize any risks and/or impacts identified, any steps
taken to minimize risk and to prevent and mitigate such
impacts, and policies and practices on risk prevention and
mitigation.308
International civil society organizations have called for these last three
points to be made public because they often carry particularly critical
consequences on state governance practices surrounding extractive sector
operations.309 These points remain unchanged at the time of publication.
Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act Rules, released by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”), are additionally relevant for tracking extractive
profits and payments. 310 Extractive companies that trade on American
public exchanges must disclose their payments for each project abroad in
order for investors to be able to hold governments accountable for those
305
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profits.311 These rules define payments to mean “a payment that is made to
further the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals, is ‘not
de minimis,’ and includes taxes, royalties, fees (including license fees),
production entitlements, and bonuses.”312
The EITI included several of these types of payments as suggested
payments for multi-stakeholder groups to incorporate into materiality
threshold determinations, but defining payments in these terms to be more
comprehensive than the EITI was no mistake given the SEC’s explicit
mention of the EITI.313 According to the SEC’s rules,
the final rules are consistent with the EITI. In instances where
the language or approach of Section 13(q) clearly deviates from
the EITI, the final rules track the statute rather than the EITI
because in those instances we believe [U.S.] Congress intended
the final rules to go beyond what is required by the EITI. We
believe this approach is consistent with Section 13(q) and
furthers the statutory goal to support international transparency
promotion efforts relating to the commercial development of
oil, natural gas, or minerals because the EITI is referenced in
Section 13(q) and is well-recognized for promoting such
transparency. 314
The United States’ standards that extend beyond EITI are positive for
shaping transparency. However, China, South Korea, India, and Thailand
have historically served as Myanmar’s largest trading partners and would
only be bound by these reporting requirements if their national companies
trade on American exchanges or if Americans run their companies.
Therefore, an important component of evaluating Myanmar’s transparency
practices lies in the country’s domestic legislation.
One specific domestic law would have especially critical impacts on
Myanmar’s transparency and would likely lead a national SWF to fail.
Myanmar’s Special Funds Law for Perpetuating National Sovereignty
(hereinafter “the Special Fund Law”) allows the commander-in-chief of the
military to request and receive discretionary special funds for “defending the
311
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constitution and the State from external and internal threats.”315 The Special
Fund lacks parliamentary oversight and Chapter 3, Article 5 even
audaciously states that, “no individual person or organization is allowed to
scrutinize or audit the usage of the Special Fund.”316
The Special Funds Law has clear implications for a potential national
SWF. Even if Myanmar establishes a fully transparent SWF that is funded
with transparent revenue in compliance with the aforementioned
international commitments, the Special Funds Law could provide a domestic
legal basis for Myanmar’s leaders to redirect transparent funds from the
SWF to fund opaque operations from the Special Fund Account. As a result,
Myanmar must demonstrate its commitment to align domestic transparency
best practices with international standards and initiatives before officials can
be provided with an avenue to further siphon funds from the state.
B.

Corruption

Domestic pressures and political corruption, broadly defined as the
misuse of political authority, can negatively impact SWF performance. This
section discusses the extent of this pressure to examine Myanmar’s existing
levels of corruption. In doing so, the combination of Myanmar’s existing
level of corruption and SWF’s general lack of transparency would put a
Myanmar SWF at risk of succumbing to pressures for domestic involvement.
This could include investing profits in domestic sectors, which could result
in a fund that underperforms compared to investment options otherwise
unhampered by domestic involvement.
In a survey of 2,662 investments by twenty-nine SWFs made between
1984 and 2007, a team of Harvard Business School (“HBS”) researchers
found that the political process can introduce short-run pressures on SWFs to
accommodate public demands for job creation and economic stabilization
within the country and can lead to political intervention that sharply deviates
from originally stated plans for long-term maximization.317 In addition,
countries may acquiesce to pressures to grant politicians increased
managerial input over SWF investments to achieve non-monetary domestic
315
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objectives rather than ensuring financial experts and technocrats maximize
investment returns.318
The HBS researchers also compared SWF management to the
International Country Risk Guide, a widely accepted indicator score for
evaluating country corruption that ranks countries from zero (most corrupt)
to ten (least corrupt), and discovered that each additional point of corruption
yields a 10.8% greater likelihood that countries will focus funds to domestic
investments. 319 Disturbingly, the researchers then found that politically
influenced funds that made direct domestic investments significantly
underperformed by 16% in six months following investment compared to
SWFs managed by foreign experts who would otherwise seek to make
global investments for higher returns. 320
Myanmar is plagued by corruption. The 2011 Corruption Perception
Index (“CPI”), an annual index released by Transparency International that
rates perceptions of domestic corruption, found that Myanmar ranked 180th
out of 183 countries as one of the most corrupt states in the world.321 Even
during recent reforms, the 2012 CPI, the most recent version publically
released, scored Myanmar at 172 out of 176 countries surveyed, ranking
above only Sudan, Afghanistan, North Korea, and Somalia.322 According to
a report by Quartz, Atlantic Media’s business-focused online news
magazine, SWFs do not consistently lead to reductions of corruption in
petroleum states,323 and as a partial result, SWFs can serve as slush funds for
additional corruption. One example of the corrupt use of SWFs is the
Iranian Stabilization Fund (“ISF”).324 The ISF was initially designed to
compensate for commodity price volatility and support entrepreneurial
enterprises in expanding industries, 325 but instead the ISF has financed
“bonuses to government retirees, payments for gasoline imports, the
expansion of the Basij (the volunteer militia) and the purchase of new police
equipment.”326
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The corrupt use of a SWF would have especially detrimental impacts
for Myanmar amidst the country’s privatization reforms. Myanmar has
initiated a series of privatization reforms, known locally as “pocketization”
because state owned businesses are sold off to well-connected individuals
with deep crony ties to government leaders.327 If government leaders are
successful in biasing fund objectives to direct SWF resources domestically,
as predicted by the HBS team, a Myanmar SWF has an increased chance of
being used as a seemingly legitimate way to further fund illegitimate crony
interests under the guise of SWFs leading domestically-focused privatization
reforms and economic development initiatives.
Even worse, state officials potentially cannot be held accountable for
these pocketization practices. Chapter 445 of Myanmar’s constitution states,
“No proceedings shall be instituted against the said Councils or any member
thereof or any member of the Government, in respect of any act done in the
execution of their respective duties.”328 Therefore, not only could corrupt
government officials redirect funds from a SWF to support crony interests,
but these individuals would actually be protected by law in the course of
illicitly privatizing state resources.
Detailed analysis of SWF performance conducted by the HBS team
raises concern that Myanmar’s own corrupt practices would negatively
impact a potential SWF performance. The ability to bias fund activities,
combined with explicit indemnity offered to government officials in Chapter
445 of Myanmar’s constitution, creates conditions that are inhospitable for
proper fund management. Resultantly, Myanmar should not establish a
SWF until corrupt practices can be stymied and effective legal regulations
hold government accountable for state resource revenue.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This article draws global lessons from existing SWFs to speculate
how creating a SWF with Myanmar’s resource profits would impact
Myanmar and mitigate concerns associated with the resource curse.
Following a thorough analysis, this article demonstrates that Myanmar
currently lacks important components needed to establish and responsibly
manage an effective SWF.
Highlighting the reasons why Myanmar is not prepared to establish a
SWF at the present time provides a snapshot of specific steps Myanmar can
327
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implement to strengthen its governance and economic practices. These steps
are key components for Myanmar’s development, but would undoubtedly
require deliberate and sustained effort. However, in the course of pursuing
these steps, Myanmar could simultaneously create conditions to establish a
well-managed SWF in the future.
Myanmar must continue to engage the international community to
build the domestic legislative and financial skill sets needed to manage
future legal, regulatory, and economic reforms. The resulting framework
will then ideally offer Myanmar’s rising experts an opportunity to build the
fiscal discipline necessary to reconcile state spending priorities with the
needs of the people and build an authentic balance of payments surpluses.
During this time, Myanmar’s Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank must
demonstrate their ability to manage resource revenue and macroeconomic
concerns prior to outsourcing this responsibility to foreign advisors.
Myanmar’s leaders should also recognize the importance of building a
diversified economy with profits from non-renewable resources. Building a
self-sustaining domestic economy will be a monumental feat, but can be
assisted by reforming agricultural practices with an aim at regaining worldleading crop exports, providing credit to farmers to support upward growth,
and improving product transportation networks. Stabilization problems will
always exist in varying degrees as Myanmar modernizes, but experts agree
that building a diversified economic base is preferable to developing
complex financial tools to mitigate problems caused by not supporting
economic diversity.329
Leaders who achieve this goal will be recognized by the population,
thus rebuilding a social compact in a country long divided by military rule.
In addition, governments and foreign investors focused on Myanmar’s
resources should support civil society calls to formulate intergenerational
justice strategies. Successful efforts to build profit-sharing systems, even if
they are not similar to the APF’s dividends, will equitably spread benefits of
extractive projects to local citizens. With a system to spread benefits,
extractive companies and communities can share the desire to further
develop natural resources while generating profits used to improve society.
Bridging inherent political divides in Myanmar to achieve these goals
will surely take time. However, Myanmar has experienced monumental
change in the past two years and it is impossible to speculate exactly what
further reforms will occur after the country’s upcoming election in 2015. As
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a result, international onlookers should cautiously await the next election to
gauge prevailing political opinions prior to establishing any kind of longterm financial plans.
Myanmar also has the ability to reform multiple controversial laws
specified throughout this article. The country can start by repealing Penal
Code 505(b) and the Decree to allow citizens to freely voice opinions about
the direction of their country and the use of the country’s non-renewable
profits without fearing arrest. Furthermore, the Farmland Law and the VFV
Law should be amended to provide greater individual and local benefits,
while also introducing legislation to define how regions most affected by
extractive projects will benefit from continued project expansions.
Lastly, there is no silver bullet to reverse the endemic corruption that
has strangled Myanmar for decades. However, to paraphrase United States
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, “sunlight is the best disinfectant” and
Myanmar can take strides towards reducing corruption by increasing
transparency. 330 Ensuring Myanmar meets its expressed obligations to the
EITI and OGP are great starting points, and designing domestic parallel
structures to Western investment guidelines can help ensure that nonWestern based foreign investments do not take advantage of Myanmar or
threaten governance building measures. Similarly, in committing to these
practices, Myanmar should define uses and oversight for the State Fund
Account to complement ongoing transparency initiatives as well as add a
layer of accountability to government officials by revising or repealing
Chapter 445 of the constitution.
These steps are admittedly ambitious and may take generations to
ultimately accomplish. However, the pace of the most recent reforms gives
hope that these additional steps may be achievable in this lifetime and
completed without dependence on complex financial instruments.
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